Corporate governance, product innovation, and competition

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


We show that duopolistic innovation competition between identical firms may lead to an equilibrium with asymmetric corporate governance modes with one firm being shareholder oriented and its rival stakeholder oriented. This happens if the benefit associated with innovation success faced by the stakeholders falls short of an endogenously determined threshold. Above this threshold, the corporate governance equilibrium is symmetric with both firms oriented toward maximization of shareholder value.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalBulletin of Economic Research
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)1067-1074
Number of pages8
Publication statusPublished - 08.02.2022
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed


  • 511 Economics
  • competition
  • corporate governance
  • innovation
  • stakeholder versus shareholder


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