Abstract
Even though cross ownership raises industry profits, we demonstrate that it is prone to a commitment problem. Specifically, we show that producers in a Cournot duopoly have unilateral incentives to resell their minority share-holdings in the rival to outside investors, leading to an equilibrium with complete divestments. This feature challenges the stability of cross ownership configurations.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 109748 |
| Peer-reviewed scientific journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 201 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| ISSN | 0165-1765 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 12.02.2021 |
| MoE publication type | A1 Journal article - refereed |
Keywords
- 511 Economics
- Cross ownership
- Divestment incentives