Abstract
In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A’s decisions before making his/her own. We find a contagion effect of embezzlement in that facing a corrupt official A increases the likelihood of embezzlement by Official B. Likewise, deterrence matters in that higher detection probabilities significantly decrease the likelihood of embezzlement. Crucially, when the same deterrence policy applies to both officials, detection is more effective in curbing embezzlement if chosen by an honest public official A rather than a corrupt public official A. This legitimacy effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies can fail in countries where the government itself is believed (or known) to be corrupt.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Peer-reviewed scientific journal | Journal of Legal Studies |
| ISSN | 0047-2530 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 06.2019 |
| MoE publication type | A1 Journal article - refereed |
Keywords
- 511 Economics
- expeirmental economics
- behavioural economics
- game theory
- microeconomics
- welfare analysis
- honesty
- corruption
- process fairness
Sustainable Development Goals
- GOAL 12: Responsible Consumption and Production
- GOAL 16: Peace and Justice Strong Institutions
- GOAL 06: Clean Water and Sanitation
- GOAL 08: Decent Work and Economic Growth
- GOAL 01: No Poverty
- GOAL 03: Good Health and Well-being
- GOAL 02: Zero Hunger
Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)
- AoS: Competition economics and service strategy - Quantitative consumer behaviour and competition economics