Disclosure Regulation and Competitive Interactions: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Industry

Marc Badia, Miguel Duro, Bjorn N. Jorgensen, Gaizka Ormazabal

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We study the effects of mandatory disclosure on competitive interactions in the setting of oil & gas (O&G) reserve disclosures by North American public firms. We document that reserve disclosures inform competitors: when one firm announces larger increases in O&G reserves, competitors experience lower announcement returns and higher real investments. To sharpen identification, we analyze several sources of cross-sectional variation in these patterns, the degree of competition and the sign and the source of reserves changes. We also exploit two plausibly exogenous shocks: the tightening of the O&G reserve disclosure rules and the introduction of fracking technology. Additional tests more directly focused on the presence of proprietary costs confirm that the mandated reserve disclosures result in a relative loss of competitive edge for announcing firms. Our collective evidence highlights important trade-offs in the market-wide effects of disclosure regulation.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalThe Accounting Review
Volume96
Issue number5
Pages (from-to)1-29
ISSN0001-4826
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10.2020
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed

Keywords

  • 512 Business and Management
  • proprietary costs
  • competition
  • disclosure rules
  • disclosure of oil and gas reserves
  • informational spillovers
  • real externalities of disclosure regulation

Sustainable Development Goals

  • GOAL 08: Decent Work and Economic Growth

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

  • AoS: Financial management, accounting, and governance

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