Abstract
In this paper we use Heckman selection models to analyse the relation between the likelihood of the firm becoming a takeover target, the takeover premium, and the use of anti-takeover devices. Ordinary least squares regressions suggest that anti-takeover devices, especially dual class shares, are associated with a higher takeover premium. However, we also document that anti-takeover devices reduce the likelihood that the firm will be taken over. When we control for the fact that takeover targets are selected, we do not find a significant relation between the takeover premium and dual class shares. Hence, our results suggest that the takeover premium is indeed influenced by private information about the likelihood of takeover.
Original language | English |
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Peer-reviewed scientific journal | The European Journal of Finance |
Volume | 20 |
Issue number | 4 |
Pages (from-to) | 319-340 |
Number of pages | 22 |
ISSN | 1351-847X |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2014 |
MoE publication type | A1 Journal article - refereed |
Keywords
- 511 Economics
- KOTA2012