Earnings performance measures and CEO turnover: Street versus GAAP earnings

Henry Jarva*, Juha-Pekka Kallunki, Gilad Livne

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)


Prior research reports that analysts focus on street earnings, which are measures that typically exceed GAAP earnings. Using a sample of CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2016 we show that the likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover - but not voluntary turnover - are higher when analysts exclude income-decreasing items. The association between exclusions and forced turnovers is particularly pronounced for high magnitude exclusions. We also show that greater street exclusion of income-decreasing items, the lower CEO bonus payouts. We find that boards use audited and more conservative GAAP earnings in evaluating and dismissing CEOs, except in the recent period of 2010–2016.

Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalJournal of Corporate Finance
Pages (from-to)249-266
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - 06.2019
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed


  • 512 Business and Management
  • CEO turnover
  • GAAP earnings
  • Street earnings
  • Street exclusions


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