ESG and CEO turnover around the world

Gonul Colak, Timo Korkeamäki*, Niclas Meyer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


We investigate whether CEOs around the world are held accountable for stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. The likelihood of CEO turnover increases significantly when the media coverage of the ESG incidents reaches extreme levels. CEO turnovers occur even in the cases where an incident does not lead to a stock price decline. In such cases, the board likely has a non-pecuniary motive for the turnover. This suggests that such non-pecuniary reputational concerns are an important determinant of CEO turnover decisions around the world, especially when the firm is facing intense public pressure due to stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. This effect is more pronounced when firms are headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries like many European countries.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102523
Peer-reviewed scientific journalJournal of Corporate Finance
Publication statusPublished - 01.02.2024
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed


  • 512 Business and Management
  • ESG risk
  • CEO turnover
  • shareholder value maximization
  • pecuniary costs
  • non-pecuniary considerations

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

  • AoS: Financial management, accounting, and governance


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