The purpose of the paper is to study the tensions the institutional combination of the ideal type logics of public administration and corporate governance generates in the so-called first-pillar public-private pension systems, and the effects these tensions may have to the reform capacity of the system. The paper is based on the case study of the Finnish mandatory earnings-related pension scheme for private sector workers (TyEL). It is argued that the logics of both ideal types can be combined by enabling both logics in parallel, by clearly demarcating the boundaries of both logics, or by actively suppressing one of the logics. The TyEL scheme combines logics from both paradigms in ways that resemble a franchising-type combination of administrative paradigms, however with some limitations. The main tensions in the field are caused by asymmetries in the decentralization of the scheme, and by the role of the social partners and institutional brokers in the field. These tensions have helped innovating existing institutional paths, enabling solutions unavailable to ideal type models, and defending the system from external pressures. It is concluded, however, that these innovations have also reinforced the existing tensions.
|Peer-reviewed scientific journal||Hallinnon tutkimus|
|Publication status||Published - 2011|
|MoE publication type||A1 Journal article - refereed|
- 512 Business and Management