History-dependent Reciprocity in Alternating Offer Bargaining

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


This paper studies alternating-offer bargaining with players who have history-dependent reciprocity preferences. To allow for reciprocal motivation, the existing history-dependent models are modified by reversing the way aspirations depend on previous offers. The model exhibits a unique equilibrium where an agreement is reached immediately. As the players' discount factors approach unity, players share the pie according to the golden division: the responder's share of the whole pie coincides with the ratio of the proposer's and the responder's shares. Thus, there is a first-mover disadvantage.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalFinnish Economic Papers
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)1-15
Number of pages15
Publication statusPublished - 2010
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed


  • 511 Economics


Dive into the research topics of 'History-dependent Reciprocity in Alternating Offer Bargaining'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this