How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?

Tore Ellingsen*, Robert Östling, Erik Wengström

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.

Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalGames and Economic Behavior
Pages (from-to)153-181
Number of pages29
Publication statusPublished - 01.01.2018
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed


  • 511 Economics
  • Cheap talk
  • Pre-play communication
  • Noncooperative game theory


Dive into the research topics of 'How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this