Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions

Marco Lambrecht, Eugenio Proto, Aldo Rustichini, Andis Sofianos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

How does the information on players’ intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, does not provide useful predictions. We experimentally show that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma disclosure hampers cooperation; higher intelligence players trust their partners less when playing against someone of lower ability. Similarly, in the Battle of Sexes with low payoff inequality, disclosure disrupts coordination, as higher intelligence players try to force their most preferred outcome. Instead, with higher payoff inequality, behavior changes and higher intelligence players concede. We analyze the reasons for these patterns of behavior.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics
ISSN1945-7669
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 16.10.2023
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed

Keywords

  • 511 Economics
  • Repeated prisoners dilemma
  • Cooperation
  • Intelligence
  • IQ

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

  • AoS: Competition economics and service strategy - Quantitative consumer behaviour and competition economics

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