Investment preferences and patient capital: financing, governance, and regulation in pension fund capitalism

Michael A. McCarthy, Ville-Pekka Sorsa, Natascha van der Zwan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In comparative political economy, the patience of capital investment has often been explained with the political activity of stakeholders. Such scholarship attributes investment preferences to either set assumptions about what various actors are likely to want from their pension systems or to macro-level institutional factors. Comparing the preferences of business and labor actors in the occupational pension systems in Finland, the Netherlands, and the USA, we argue that preferences are better explained more dynamically and emerge from meso-level institutional forces. We find that financing needs and capacities, governance capacities and financial regulations explain changes in labor and business preferences with regard to fund investment. In each of the cases, a combination of these three institutional factors explains a preference shift toward more varied and more impatient investing.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalSocio-Economic Review
Volume14
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)751-769
Number of pages19
ISSN1475-1461
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 11.09.2016
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed

Keywords

  • 512 Business and Management

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