Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening

Thomas Gehrig; Rune Stenbacka

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102718

Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening

Thomas Gehrig^*, Rune Stenbacka

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics, Helsinki

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. We characterize the effect of market structure on screening by comparing a duopoly with a monopoly in the journal market. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. With sequential submissions, competition between journals induces adverse selection effects, whereby the average quality of the pool of submissions is degraded in response to acceptance of high-quality manuscripts. We outline how information exchange between journals impact on this adverse selection mechanism.

Original language	English
Article number	102718
Peer-reviewed scientific journal	International Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume	76
Number of pages	54
ISSN	0167-7187
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102718
Publication status	Published - 19.02.2021
MoE publication type	A1 Journal article - refereed

Keywords

511 Economics
Imperfect screening
Sequential submissions
Simultaneous submissions
Delay

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

AoS: Competition economics and service strategy - Quantitative consumer behaviour and competition economics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102718

OpenUrl availability

Full text

Cite this

@article{4a5b8cd52a3b49b18970386e0a138263,

title = "Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening",

abstract = "We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. We characterize the effect of market structure on screening by comparing a duopoly with a monopoly in the journal market. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. With sequential submissions, competition between journals induces adverse selection effects, whereby the average quality of the pool of submissions is degraded in response to acceptance of high-quality manuscripts. We outline how information exchange between journals impact on this adverse selection mechanism.",

keywords = "511 Economics, Imperfect screening, Sequential submissions, Simultaneous submissions, Delay",

author = "Thomas Gehrig and Rune Stenbacka",

note = "Funding Information: We are grateful for valuable comments from seminar participants at the IFN Conference in Vaxholm (Stockholm) 2013 and EARIE (Milan) 2014, and, in particular, our discussants Yossi Spiegel and Martin Peitz. We also thank two anonymous referees and the editor, Giacomo Calzolari, for excellent feedback and valuable suggestions that greatly helped to improve the paper. Stenbacka gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters. Funding Information: ? We are grateful for valuable comments from seminar participants at the IFN Conference in Vaxholm (Stockholm) 2013 and EARIE (Milan) 2014, and, in particular, our discussants Yossi Spiegel and Martin Peitz. We also thank two anonymous referees and the editor, Giacomo Calzolari, for excellent feedback and valuable suggestions that greatly helped to improve the paper. Stenbacka gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Elsevier B.V. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",

year = "2021",

month = feb,

day = "19",

doi = "10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102718",

language = "English",

volume = "76",

journal = "International Journal of Industrial Organization",

issn = "0167-7187",

publisher = "Elsevier BV * North-Holland",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening

AU - Gehrig, Thomas

AU - Stenbacka, Rune

N1 - Funding Information: We are grateful for valuable comments from seminar participants at the IFN Conference in Vaxholm (Stockholm) 2013 and EARIE (Milan) 2014, and, in particular, our discussants Yossi Spiegel and Martin Peitz. We also thank two anonymous referees and the editor, Giacomo Calzolari, for excellent feedback and valuable suggestions that greatly helped to improve the paper. Stenbacka gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters. Funding Information: ? We are grateful for valuable comments from seminar participants at the IFN Conference in Vaxholm (Stockholm) 2013 and EARIE (Milan) 2014, and, in particular, our discussants Yossi Spiegel and Martin Peitz. We also thank two anonymous referees and the editor, Giacomo Calzolari, for excellent feedback and valuable suggestions that greatly helped to improve the paper. Stenbacka gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Elsevier B.V. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2021/2/19

Y1 - 2021/2/19

N2 - We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. We characterize the effect of market structure on screening by comparing a duopoly with a monopoly in the journal market. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. With sequential submissions, competition between journals induces adverse selection effects, whereby the average quality of the pool of submissions is degraded in response to acceptance of high-quality manuscripts. We outline how information exchange between journals impact on this adverse selection mechanism.

AB - We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. We characterize the effect of market structure on screening by comparing a duopoly with a monopoly in the journal market. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. With sequential submissions, competition between journals induces adverse selection effects, whereby the average quality of the pool of submissions is degraded in response to acceptance of high-quality manuscripts. We outline how information exchange between journals impact on this adverse selection mechanism.

KW - 511 Economics

KW - Imperfect screening

KW - Sequential submissions

KW - Simultaneous submissions

KW - Delay

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85102000796&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102718

DO - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102718

M3 - Article

VL - 76

JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization

JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization

SN - 0167-7187

M1 - 102718

ER -

Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening

Abstract

Keywords

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

Access to Document

OpenUrl availability

Other files and links

Embargoed Document

Fingerprint

Cite this