Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening

Thomas Gehrig*, Rune Stenbacka

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. We characterize the effect of market structure on screening by comparing a duopoly with a monopoly in the journal market. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. With sequential submissions, competition between journals induces adverse selection effects, whereby the average quality of the pool of submissions is degraded in response to acceptance of high-quality manuscripts. We outline how information exchange between journals impact on this adverse selection mechanism.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102718
Peer-reviewed scientific journalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume76
Number of pages54
ISSN0167-7187
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 19.02.2021
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed

Keywords

  • 511 Economics
  • Imperfect screening
  • Sequential submissions
  • Simultaneous submissions
  • Delay

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

  • AoS: Competition economics and service strategy - Quantitative consumer behaviour and competition economics

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