Noncompete agreements, training, and wage competition

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


We study the effects of noncompete agreements in an environment where firms invest in training junior workers. After obtaining employer-provided training, trained workers can choose whether to remain loyal to their initial employer or switch to the competing employer. We evaluate the effects of noncompete agreements on wages, employment, investment in training, production, profits, and total welfare. Firms earn higher profits and pay lower average wage when they require workers to sign noncompete agreements.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalJournal of Economics & Management Strategy
Publication statusPublished - 22.12.2022
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed


  • 511 Economics


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