Abstract
This study examines the shareholder voting outcomes concerning individual director nominees in the context of mandated gender quotas in France. Contrary to the arguments of gender quota opponents, our findings indicate that the supply of qualified female candidates meets the quota induced incremental demand. The results suggest that the prior underrepresentation of female directors results from director labour market frictions. Notably, we observe greater support for female nominees subsequent to the quota introduction. However, the disparities in voting outcomes between female and male nominees can be entirely explained by controlling for director characteristics. An important discovery from our analysis is that shareholders revise their assessment of female qualifications post-quota, thereby establishing female qualifications as equally valuable as those of their male counterparts. Overall, our study has significant implications for the ongoing debate concerning mandated gender quotas in shaping corporate governance practices.
Original language | English |
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Peer-reviewed scientific journal | Corporate Governance: An International Review |
Pages (from-to) | 1-44 |
Number of pages | 44 |
ISSN | 0964-8410 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 27.03.2025 |
MoE publication type | A1 Journal article - refereed |
Keywords
- 511 Economics
- board gender diversity
- corporate governance
- director elections
- mandated gender quotas
- optimal board composition
- shareholder votes