Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market

Marc Ivaldi; Jiekai Zhang

doi:10.1111/joie.12274

Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market

Marc Ivaldi^*, Jiekai Zhang

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics, Helsinki

Toulouse School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We contribute to the analysis of mergers in two-sided markets, in which a platform provides its service for free on one side but obtains all its revenues from the other. A structural model allowing for multi-homing of advertisers is developed to assess a decision of the French competition authority, which approves the merger of the broadcasting services of TV channels but prohibits the merger of their advertising sales services through a behavioral remedy. We show that ignoring the interaction between the two sides of platforms in designing competition or regulatory policy can result in unexpected outcomes.

Original language	English
Peer-reviewed scientific journal	The Journal of Industrial Economics
Volume	70
Issue number	3
Pages (from-to)	591-630
Number of pages	40
ISSN	0022-1821
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12274
Publication status	Published - 26.03.2022
MoE publication type	A1 Journal article - refereed

Keywords

511 Economics

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

AoS: Competition economics and service strategy - Quantitative consumer behaviour and competition economics

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1111/joie.12274Licence: CC BY

The J Industrial Economics - 2022 - Ivaldi - Platform Mergers Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV MarketFinal published version, 593 KBLicence: CC BY

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Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market

Abstract

Keywords

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

UN SDGs

Access to Document

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