Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market

Marc Ivaldi*, Jiekai Zhang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


We contribute to the analysis of mergers in two-sided markets, in which a platform provides its service for free on one side but obtains all its revenues from the other. A structural model allowing for multi-homing of advertisers is developed to assess a decision of the French competition authority, which approves the merger of the broadcasting services of TV channels but prohibits the merger of their advertising sales services through a behavioral remedy. We show that ignoring the interaction between the two sides of platforms in designing competition or regulatory policy can result in unexpected outcomes.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalThe Journal of Industrial Economics
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)591-630
Number of pages40
Publication statusPublished - 26.03.2022
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed


  • 511 Economics

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

  • AoS: Competition economics and service strategy - Quantitative consumer behaviour and competition economics


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