Selective Disclosure, Expertise Acquisition and Price Informativeness

Bjorn N. Jorgensen, Jing Li, Nahum D. Melumad

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We examine how a firm's disclosure-audience policy affects investors' expertise acquisition and price informativeness in the market. We distinguish the investors' information advantage due to superior access from that due to superior ability to process information. We show that targeted selective disclosure to sophisticated investors may encourage greater expertise acquisition on the part of investors and lead to more informative prices than either public disclosure or untargeted selective disclosure, because the value of expertise is maximized if sophisticated investors gain exclusive information access at a relatively low cost. These results illuminate the persistence of private communications between investors and firms in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure era and provide implications for regulators in addressing increasing concerns raised about the enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalContemporary Accounting Research
ISSN0823-9150
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 25.04.2022
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed

Keywords

  • 512 Business and Management
  • selective disclosure
  • information access cost
  • expertise acquisition
  • price informativeness

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

  • AoS: Financial management, accounting, and governance

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