Strategic waiting in the IPO markets

Gonul Colak, Hikmet Günay

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)


The paper analyzes the strategic waiting tendencies of IPO firms. Our game theoretic model shows why some high-quality firms may strategically delay their initial public offering until a favorable signal about the economic conditions is generated by other issuing firms. Survival analysis suggests that IPOs in the highest quality decile have significantly higher median waiting days (since the start of a rising IPO cycle) than the IPOs in the lowest decile. During the early stages of an expanding IPO cycle the average firm quality is lower than in its later stages. We find supporting evidence also from the IPOs of future S&P 500 firms.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalJournal of Corporate Finance
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)555-583
Number of pages29
Publication statusPublished - 01.06.2011
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed


  • 512 Business and Management
  • clustering
  • Information aggregation
  • IPO cycles
  • Social learning
  • Strategic waiting
  • Survival analysis


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