The Impact of Investor Horizon on Say-on-Pay Voting

Konstantinos Stathopoulos, Georgios Voulgaris

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Shareholder investment horizons have a significant impact on say-on-pay voting patterns. Short-term investors are more likely to avoid expressing opinion on executive pay proposals by casting an abstaining vote. They vote against board proposals on pay only in cases where the CEO already receives excessive pay levels. In contrast, long-term investors typically cast favourable votes. According to our findings, this is due to effective monitoring rather than collusion with the management. Overall, investor heterogeneity in terms of investment horizons helps explain say-on-pay voting, in particular the low levels of say-on-pay dissent, which have recently raised questions over the efficiency of this corporate governance mechanism.
Original languageEnglish
Peer-reviewed scientific journalBritish Journal of Management
Volume27
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)796-818
Number of pages23
ISSN1045-3172
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed

Keywords

  • 512 Business and Management

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