The timing of voluntary delisting

Alcino Azevedo, Gonul Colak*, Izidin El Kalak, Radu Tunaru

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

For many firms, voluntarily delisting from a stock exchange can be optimal. We model an entrepreneur's incentives to voluntarily delist the firm as a trade-off between consumption of private benefits when listed and expected improvements in the firm's performance after delisting. Our model allows for heterogeneity across firms and countries, and various micro and macro shocks affect the delisting decision. Such a model makes novel predictions regarding the delisting patterns around the world. We empirically confirm these predictions using manually collected delisting data from 26 countries. Increasing policy and regulatory uncertainties can partially explain the greater popularity of voluntary delistings.
Original languageEnglish
Article number103832
Peer-reviewed scientific journalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume155
Number of pages21
ISSN0304-405X
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 03.04.2024
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article - refereed

Keywords

  • 511 Economics
  • voluntary delisting
  • political uncertainty
  • regulatory uncertainty
  • competing risk
  • 512 Business and Management

Areas of Strength and Areas of High Potential (AoS and AoHP)

  • AoS: Financial management, accounting, and governance

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