The unintended consequences of a quantitative, centralized faculty promotion system: empirical evidence from a developing country

The Iranian higher education system is expansive, boasting nearly 80,000 faculty members. To guarantee transparency, fairness, and the alignment of professors’ activities with the priorities of higher education policies, its promotion system is centralized and relies heavily on quantitative measures of performance. This study identifies the unintended consequences facing the promotion system in Iranian public universities. The data sources include interviews and discussion sessions with faculty members and policymakers, along with policy and regulatory documents related to the promotion system. The results reveal that the system’s shortcomings have led to low-quality teaching and research activities, devaluation of academic tasks other than research publication, unethical practices, and a decline in faculty well-being. The impact, however, varies depending on each faculty member’s individual profile and institutional factors. Despite the unintended consequences of a centralized quantitative promotion assessment, decentralization does not appear to be feasible or straightforward for all higher education institutions, at least in the short term; not all institutions have the capability and resources to craft and enforce their promotion system. However, the criteria and processes used in the centralized promotion system could be improved by simplifying the measures, enhancing the evaluation processes, adding some qualitative dimensions of assessment, and providing institutional resources for faculty members’ professional development.