Abstract
Private equity firms (PE firms) have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. We show that the threat of a PE acquisition can trigger incumbent mergers in an otherwise merger-stable industry. This can help antitrust authorities maximize consumer surplus because previously privately unprofitable – but consumer surplus-enhancing – mergers now take place. We thus predict that merger waves among incumbents should follow the development of a local PE industry.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Peer-reviewed scientific journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 164 |
| Pages (from-to) | 31-34 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| ISSN | 0165-1765 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 03.2018 |
| MoE publication type | A1 Journal article - refereed |
Keywords
- 511 Economics
- Antitrust policy
- M&As
- Private equity
- Temporary ownership