Active Investors, Passive Investors, and Common Ownership

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

Recent studies have extensively examined the hypothesis that a higher degree of common ownership relaxes competition. This approach has typically conducted comparative statics analysis based on exogenously given rates of common ownership. This study constructs a simple model in which common ownership emerges as an equilibrium outcome resulting from ownership acquisition. We characterize the equilibrium incentives of institutional owners to acquire common ownership of the firms operating in a duopolistic product market. Further, we explore the effects of common ownership on passive investors, consumer welfare, and total welfare.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftAEA Papers and Proceedings
Volym110
Sidor (från-till)565-568
Antal sidor4
ISSN2574-0768
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 01.05.2020
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi

Fingeravtryck Fördjupa i forskningsämnen för ”Active Investors, Passive Investors, and Common Ownership”. Tillsammans bildar de ett unikt fingeravtryck.

Citera det här