An Overlapping Generations Model of Taxpayer Bailouts of Banks

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

4 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

The paper constructs an overlapping generations model to evaluate how different bank rescue plans affect banks’ risk-taking incentives. For a non-competitive banking industry, we find bailout with tax imposed on the old generation or equity bail-in to be efficient policies in the sense that they implement socially optimal risk-taking. In a competitive banking sector, no-bailout implements the socially-optimal risk-taking. Bailout policies financed by a tax imposed on the young generation always induce excessive risk-taking.
OriginalspråkEngelska
ArtikelnummerJFS578
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of financial stability
Volym33
UtgåvaDecember
Sidor (från-till)71-80
Antal sidor10
ISSN1572-3089
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 2017
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 512 Företagsekonomi

Fingeravtryck Fördjupa i forskningsämnen för ”An Overlapping Generations Model of Taxpayer Bailouts of Banks”. Tillsammans bildar de ett unikt fingeravtryck.

Citera det här