Anti-corruption policy making, discretionary power and institutional quality: An experimental analysis

Amadou Boly, Robert Gillanders*

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

22 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

We analyse policymakers’ incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that ‘public officials’, even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own actions (legal equality), compared to a setting where it does not (legal inequality). More surprising perhaps is the finding that policy-makers do not choose a zero level of detection on average, even when it applies to them too. Finally, corruption is significantly lower when the detection probability is exogenously set, suggesting that the institutional power to choose detection can itself be corruptive.

OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volym152
NummerAugust
Sidor (från-till)314-327
Antal sidor14
ISSN0167-2681
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 19.06.2018
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi

Fingeravtryck

Fördjupa i forskningsämnen för ”Anti-corruption policy making, discretionary power and institutional quality: An experimental analysis”. Tillsammans bildar de ett unikt fingeravtryck.

Citera det här