Anti-Poaching Agreements in Labor Markets

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Sammanfattning

We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftEconomic Inquiry
Volym57
Utgåva1
Sidor (från-till)243-263
Antal sidor22
ISSN0095-2583
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 28.07.2018
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

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  • 512 Företagsekonomi

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