Bearing the burden: Implications of tax reporting institutions on evasion and incidence

Kaisa Kotakorpi, Tuomas Nurminen, Topi Miettinen, Satu Metsälampi*

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

We investigate effects of tax reporting institutions on evasion and incidence using an experimental double auction market. We find that 28% of the sellers are truthful when only sellers report, but that 88% and 64% of them are truthful under costless and costly third-party reporting by buyers, respectively. Reporting behavior therefore responds to the intensity of deterrence. However, we find that prices do not fully reflect the lower taxes of the evaders. Thus, when sellers can unilaterally evade taxes, tax incidence deviates from the prediction of the standard model, and there is deadweight loss even if tax revenue is low. Pricing, incidence, and reporting patterns in all treatments are consistent with a model with heterogeneous lying costs, or a combination of lying costs and image concerns that give rise to a motivation to appear honest.

OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volym220
Sidor (från-till)81-134
Antal sidor54
ISSN0167-2681
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 19.02.2024
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi

Styrkeområden och områden med hög potential (AoS och AoHP)

  • AoS: Konkurrensanalys och servicestrategi - Kvantitativt konsumentbeteende och konkurrensekonomi

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