CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited

Katherine Guthrie, Jan Sokolowsky, Kam Ming Wan*

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

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83 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/Nasdaq board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensation committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis.

OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of Finance
Volym67
Utgåva3
Sidor (från-till)1149-1168
Antal sidor20
ISSN0022-1082
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 01.06.2012
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

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  • 511 Nationalekonomi

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