Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining

Topi Miettinen, Christoph Vanberg

Forskningsoutput: Bok/rapportBeställd rapport


We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining, allowing players to take an aggressive bargaining posture by attempting to commit to a bargaining position prior to each round of negotiations. Any such attempted commitment fails with an exogenously given probability. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibria. Under unanimity rule, an inefficient equilibrium always exists and no efficient equilibria exist if and only if the probability of the commitment failing is sufficiently large. Efficient commitment profiles cannot be sustained in equilibrium if the number of players is sufficiently large. Under any (super)majority rule, every equilibrium is efficient. The results suggest that the unanimity rule is particularly damaging if the number of legislators is large and the time lags between consecutive sessions are long.
FörlagUniversity of Heidelberg
Antal sidor25
StatusPublicerad - 2020
MoE-publikationstypD4 Publicerad utvecklings- eller forskningsrapport eller -utredning


NamnDiscussion Paper Series
FörlagUniversity of Heidelberg, Department of Economics


  • 511 Nationalekonomi

Styrkeområden och områden med hög potential (AoS och AoHP)

  • AoS: Konkurrensanalys och servicestrategi - Kvantitativt konsumentbeteende och konkurrensekonomi


Fördjupa i forskningsämnen för ”Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining”. Tillsammans bildar de ett unikt fingeravtryck.

Citera det här