Common ownership, institutional investors, and welfare

Oz Shy, Rune Stenbacka*

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

This study evaluates the effects of institutional investors' common ownership of firms competing in the same market. Overall, common ownership has two opposing effects: (a) it serves as a device for weakening market competition, and (b) it induces diversification, thereby reducing portfolio risk. We conduct a detailed welfare analysis within which the competition‐softening effects of an increased degree of common ownership is weighted against the associated diversification benefits.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of Economics & Management Strategy
Volym29
Utgåva3
Sidor (från-till)706-723
Antal sidor18
ISSN1058-6407
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 30.05.2020
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi

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