Cross ownership and divestment incentives

Rune Stenbacka; Geert Van Moer

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109748

Cross ownership and divestment incentives

Rune Stenbacka^*, Geert Van Moer

^*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Nationalekonomi, Helsingfors

Forskningsoutput: Tidskriftsbidrag › Artikel › Vetenskaplig › Peer review

4 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

Even though cross ownership raises industry profits, we demonstrate that it is prone to a commitment problem. Specifically, we show that producers in a Cournot duopoly have unilateral incentives to resell their minority share-holdings in the rival to outside investors, leading to an equilibrium with complete divestments. This feature challenges the stability of cross ownership configurations.

Originalspråk	Engelska
Artikelnummer	109748
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskrift	Economics Letters
Volym	201
Antal sidor	13
ISSN	0165-1765
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109748
Status	Publicerad - 12.02.2021
MoE-publikationstyp	A1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

511 Nationalekonomi

Styrkeområden och områden med hög potential (AoS och AoHP)

AoS: Konkurrensanalys och servicestrategi - Kvantitativt konsumentbeteende och konkurrensekonomi

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10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109748

1-s2.0-S0165176521000252-mainPublicerad version, 371 KBLicens: CC BY

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KW - Divestment incentives

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Cross ownership and divestment incentives

Sammanfattning

Nyckelord

Styrkeområden och områden med hög potential (AoS och AoHP)

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