Design of public procurement auctions: evidence from cleaning contracts

Ari Hyytinen, Sofia Lundberg, Otto Toivanen

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5 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

We analyze a regime change from beauty contests to first-price sealed-bid and scoring auctions, using Swedish data on public procurement of cleaning services. In beauty contests, the lowest bid often lost, leaving substantial money on the table. The procurement costs were similar before and after the regime change: (i) Entry strongly decreases the procurement cost but did not change. Entry would have decreased had the municipalities not adjusted the objects of auctions. (ii) Municipalities favored in-house suppliers in the old regime, leading to more aggressive bidding by others. With favoritism reduced, these changes balanced each other out.

OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftRAND Journal of Economics
Volym49
Utgåva2
Sidor (från-till)398-426
Antal sidor29
ISSN0741-6261
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 02.05.2018
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi

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