Earnings performance measures and CEO turnover: Street versus GAAP earnings

Henry Jarva*, Juha-Pekka Kallunki, Gilad Livne

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

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10 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

Prior research reports that analysts focus on street earnings, which are measures that typically exceed GAAP earnings. Using a sample of CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2016 we show that the likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover - but not voluntary turnover - are higher when analysts exclude income-decreasing items. The association between exclusions and forced turnovers is particularly pronounced for high magnitude exclusions. We also show that greater street exclusion of income-decreasing items, the lower CEO bonus payouts. We find that boards use audited and more conservative GAAP earnings in evaluating and dismissing CEOs, except in the recent period of 2010–2016.

OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of Corporate Finance
Volym56
Sidor (från-till)249-266
Antal sidor18
ISSN0929-1199
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 06.2019
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

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