Employee effort and earnings management

Jesper Haga, Fredrik Huhtamäki, Dennis Sundvik*

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

In this study, we examine the relationship between employee effort within the firm and earnings management, using data on working hours and discretionary accruals. With higher employee effort, we find less earnings management among U.S. firms. This result is stronger when earnings are more predictable and persists after we control for endogeneity. We also find smaller earnings discontinuities with higher employee effort. Our domestic results remain the same with a global sample. Our results suggest that earnings management enables benchmark beating with greater precision than can high employee effort alone, but also that high-effort firms may be misclassified as earnings manipulators.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Artikelnummer100622
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftGlobal Finance Journal
ISSN1044-0283
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 13.02.2021
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 512 Företagsekonomi

Styrkeområden och områden med hög potential (AoS och AoHP)

  • AoS: Finansiering, redovisning och företagsstyrning

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