ESG and CEO turnover around the world

Gonul Colak; Timo Korkeamäki; Niclas Meyer

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102523

ESG and CEO turnover around the world

Gonul Colak
, Timo Korkeamäki^*
, Niclas Meyer

^*Huvudförfattare för detta arbete

Aalto University

Forskningsoutput: Tidskriftsbidrag › Artikel › Vetenskaplig › Peer review

32 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

We investigate whether CEOs around the world are held accountable for stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. The likelihood of CEO turnover increases significantly when the media coverage of the ESG incidents reaches extreme levels. CEO turnovers occur even in the cases where an incident does not lead to a stock price decline. In such cases, the board likely has a non-pecuniary motive for the turnover. This suggests that such non-pecuniary reputational concerns are an important determinant of CEO turnover decisions around the world, especially when the firm is facing intense public pressure due to stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. This effect is more pronounced when firms are headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries like many European countries.

Originalspråk	Engelska
Artikelnummer	102523
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskrift	Journal of Corporate Finance
Volym	84
ISSN	0929-1199
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102523
Status	Publicerad - 01.02.2024
MoE-publikationstyp	A1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

FN:s SDG:er

Detta resultat bidrar till följande hållbara utvecklingsmål:

SDG 4 – God utbildning
SDG 8 – Anständiga arbetsvillkor och ekonomisk tillväxt
SDG 12 – Hållbar konsumtion och produktion
SDG 13 – Bekämpa klimatförändringarna

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512 Företagsekonomi

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10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102523Licens: CC BY

1-s2.0-S0929119923001724-mainPublicerad version, 2,7 MBLicens: CC BY

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title = "ESG and CEO turnover around the world",

abstract = "We investigate whether CEOs around the world are held accountable for stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. The likelihood of CEO turnover increases significantly when the media coverage of the ESG incidents reaches extreme levels. CEO turnovers occur even in the cases where an incident does not lead to a stock price decline. In such cases, the board likely has a non-pecuniary motive for the turnover. This suggests that such non-pecuniary reputational concerns are an important determinant of CEO turnover decisions around the world, especially when the firm is facing intense public pressure due to stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. This effect is more pronounced when firms are headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries like many European countries.",

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ESG and CEO turnover around the world

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