Essays on agency problems in entrepreneurial ventures and publicly listed companies

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Sammanfattning

The aim of this research is to study agency problems in entrepreneurial ventures and publicly listed companies (PLCs). Agency problems originate from asymmetric information, and can be detrimental to a firm’s investment attractiveness, high-growth ventures’ financial markets, and listed companies’ valuation. The overarching research question is what are the agency problems among entrepreneurial ventures and publicly listed companies, are these problems similar in nature, and can they be prevented or cured?
The question is addressed in three different settings. Paper I reflects on business angel networks’ (BANs) value to startup entrepreneurs and their societal context, and provides statistics on BANs in Europe and the US. Paper II empirically investigates the impact of Israeli scaleup entrepreneurs’ criteria when selecting a Venture Capital (VC) firm, inverting the typical research order. Paper III contributes by providing answers to why certain blockholders in Finnish PLCs do not take responsibility for the company’s long-run development, but instead maximise their private utility. The authors employ descriptive statistics and quantitative research: interview data, an ordered logit regression model, longitudinal panel data with cross-sectional and time-series observations, and ordinary least squares regression.
Agency problems in startups stem from the transactional process between entrepreneur and angel investor. In this setting, the entrepreneur might provide untruthful information to the investor or abuse the funding. BAN service quality may, however, reduce information asymmetries in entrepreneurial venture quality, and build trust between entrepreneurs and investors. BANs in more mature business angel markets tend to offer better quality services than those in less mature markets.
Agency problems in scaleups manifest between VC firms and entrepreneurs, where VC managers may push entrepreneurs to take excessive risks that endanger their personal wealth. Empirically, entrepreneurial experience has a negative relationship with the importance entrepreneurs attach to valuation, which is moderated by the importance they attach to VC networks and reputation. Honest signalling of the parties’ qualities may reduce agency problems in the startup and scaleup phases.
Large state ownership and company value are negatively associated, suggesting that government owners may promote political goals rather than long-term value for all shareholders. Liquidating state ownership in non-strategic companies and re-investing the assets through ETF funds would constitute a Pareto improvement.
Ultimately, this study shows that agency problems are contextual and differ on the firm’s stage of development, namely startup, scaleup or PLC. But agency problems can be alleviated, which is important to the aggregate economy.
OriginalspråkEngelska
KvalifikationDoktor i filosofi
Handledare
  • Lahti, Tom, Examenshandledare
Tilldelningsdatum22.01.2022
UtgivningsortHelsinki
Förlag
Tryckta ISBN978-952-232-451-1
Elektroniska ISBN978-952-232-452-8
StatusPublicerad - 2021
MoE-publikationstypG5 Doktorsavhandling (artikel)

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  • 512 Företagsekonomi

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