Exit as governance: do blockholders affect corporate innovation in large US firms?

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Sammanfattning

Using a sample of large US firms, this study shows that blockholders in combination with liquidity can contribute positively to innovation (R&D investments). We contribute to the literature on managerial myopia that has focused mainly on large owners and their type (short‐term/long‐term). Our results are in line with recent theoretical studies arguing that blockholders in combination with market liquidity can mitigate managerial myopia, as suggested by the exit model of governance. The results indicate that blockholders can be efficient in resolving agency problems and that they can enhance long‐term prosperity, even when the individual blockholder investment horizon may not be long.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftAccounting & Finance
Antal sidor23
ISSN0810-5391
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 09.07.2019
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

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