How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?

Tore Ellingsen*, Robert Östling, Erik Wengström

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

4 Citeringar (Scopus)


This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.

Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftGames and Economic Behavior
Sidor (från-till)153-181
Antal sidor29
StatusPublicerad - 01.01.2018
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift


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