Identification of interdependent values in sequential first-price auctions

Daniel Bougt, Gagan Ghosh, Heng Liu*

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

We revisit the (non-)identification of affiliated interdependent-value auctions from the perspective of sequential auctions introduced by Milgrom and Weber (2000). In contrast to static auctions, prices in early rounds affect bidding in later rounds in sequential auctions, generating enough variation for testing interdependent against private values and model identification. We develop nonparametric tests and identification results by exploring the functional dependence of the pseudo values in later rounds on the prices in early rounds. We also discuss applications and extensions of our results, including cases of non-identical goods, observed covariates and unobserved heterogeneity.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Artikelnummer103033
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volym91
ISSN0167-7187
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 18.11.2023
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi

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