Sammanfattning
This paper investigates joint bidding when firms have incentives to sign subcontracts with each other after competing in the bidding stage. A bidding consortium affects the horizontal subcontracting market and, through backward induction, alters firms’ bids. Our findings challenge the current legal practice that consortia without efficiencies must pass the “no-solo-bidding test”, requiring that its members could not bid stand-alone. Our framework predicts that the formation of a temporary consortium, which has the feature that it dissolves after submitting a losing bid, benefits the procurer. The winning bid is more competitive with a temporary as compared to a structural consortium.
Originalspråk | Engelska |
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Artikelnummer | 102727 |
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskrift | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
Volym | 76 |
Antal sidor | 41 |
ISSN | 0167-7187 |
DOI | |
Status | Publicerad - 10.03.2021 |
MoE-publikationstyp | A1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift |
Nyckelord
- 511 Nationalekonomi
Fingeravtryck
Fördjupa i forskningsämnen för ”Joint bidding and horizontal subcontracting”. Tillsammans bildar de ett unikt fingeravtryck.Priser
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Nomination for the 2022 Antitrust Writing Awards
Van Moer, G. (Mottagare), 2022
Pris: Priser och utmärkelser