Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening

Thomas Gehrig*, Rune Stenbacka

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. We characterize the effect of market structure on screening by comparing a duopoly with a monopoly in the journal market. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. With sequential submissions, competition between journals induces adverse selection effects, whereby the average quality of the pool of submissions is degraded in response to acceptance of high-quality manuscripts. We outline how information exchange between journals impact on this adverse selection mechanism.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Artikelnummer102718
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volym76
Antal sidor54
ISSN0167-7187
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 19.02.2021
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi

Styrkeområden och områden med hög potential (AoS och AoHP)

  • AoS: Konkurrensanalys och servicestrategi - Kvantitativt konsumentbeteende och konkurrensekonomi

Fingeravtryck

Fördjupa i forskningsämnen för ”Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening”. Tillsammans bildar de ett unikt fingeravtryck.

Citera det här