Limited deposit insurance coverage and bank competition

Oz Shy, Rune Stenbacka, Vladimir Yankov

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

8 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

Deposit insurance designs in many countries place a limit on the coverage of deposits in each bank. However, no limits are placed on the number of accounts held with different banks. Therefore, under limited deposit insurance, some consumers open accounts with different banks to achieve higher or full deposit insurance coverage. We compare three regimes of deposit insurance: no deposit insurance, unlimited deposit insurance, and limited deposit insurance. We show that limited deposit insurance weakens competition among banks and reduces total welfare relative to no or unlimited deposit insurance.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of Banking & Finance
Volym71
UtgåvaOctober
Sidor (från-till)95-108
Antal sidor14
ISSN0378-4266
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 2016
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

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  • 511 Nationalekonomi

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