Noncompete agreements, training, and wage competition

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Sammanfattning

We study the effects of noncompete agreements in an environment where firms invest in training junior workers. After obtaining employer-provided training, trained workers can choose whether to remain loyal to their initial employer or switch to the competing employer. We evaluate the effects of noncompete agreements on wages, employment, investment in training, production, profits, and total welfare. Firms earn higher profits and pay lower average wage when they require workers to sign noncompete agreements.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of Economics & Management Strategy
ISSN1058-6407
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 22.12.2022
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi

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