TY - JOUR
T1 - Nudging cooperation in public goods provision
AU - Barron, Kai
AU - Nurminen, Tuomas
PY - 2020/4/29
Y1 - 2020/4/29
N2 - This paper experimentally studies two simple interventions that an authority figure might employ to promote cooperation in a public goods game when accurate feedback about contributions is not available. The first intervention aims to nudge participants to higher contribution levels by labeling contributions above a particular threshold as being “good”. Such a “norm-nudge” is intended to provide subjects with a clear, valenced focal point upon which they can coordinate. The second intervention aims to exploit lying aversion to induce higher contributions by requiring subjects to announce how much they contributed. We find that the nudge leads to a striking increase in the cooperation rate. By contrast, the ex post announcement mechanism does not have a significant effect on the cooperation rate. We present suggestive evidence that the nudge we use provides subjects with a focal point, helping conditional cooperators to coordinate their contributions.
AB - This paper experimentally studies two simple interventions that an authority figure might employ to promote cooperation in a public goods game when accurate feedback about contributions is not available. The first intervention aims to nudge participants to higher contribution levels by labeling contributions above a particular threshold as being “good”. Such a “norm-nudge” is intended to provide subjects with a clear, valenced focal point upon which they can coordinate. The second intervention aims to exploit lying aversion to induce higher contributions by requiring subjects to announce how much they contributed. We find that the nudge leads to a striking increase in the cooperation rate. By contrast, the ex post announcement mechanism does not have a significant effect on the cooperation rate. We present suggestive evidence that the nudge we use provides subjects with a focal point, helping conditional cooperators to coordinate their contributions.
KW - 511 Economics
KW - Cooperation
KW - Experiment
KW - Focal point
KW - Lying
KW - Nudge
KW - Public good
UR - https://econpapers.repec.org/article/zbwespost/216878.htm
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089095561&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/6ea1437a-3810-3f4b-9d70-c37220556218/
U2 - 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101542
DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101542
M3 - Article
SN - 2214-8043
VL - 88
JO - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
M1 - 101542
ER -