We analyze IPO activity under political uncertainty surrounding gubernatorial elections in the U.S. There are fewer IPOs originating from a state when it is scheduled to have an election. To establish identification, we develop a neighboring-states method that uses bordering states without elections as a control group. The dampening effect of elections on IPO activity is stronger for firms with more concentrated businesses in their home states, firms that are more dependent on government contracts (particularly state contracts), and harder-to-value firms. This dampening effect is related to lower IPO offer prices (hence higher costs of capital) during election years.
|Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskrift||Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis|
|Status||Publicerad - 04.12.2017|
|MoE-publikationstyp||A1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift|
- 512 Företagsekonomi
- 517 Statsvetenskap