Public Employees as Politicians: Evidence from Close Elections

Ari Hyytinen, Jaakko Meriläinen, Tuukka Saarimaa, Otto Toivanen, Janne Tukiainen*

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

20 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

We analyze the effect of municipal employees' political representation in municipal councils on local public spending. We use within-party, as-good-as-random variation in close elections in the Finnish open-list proportional election system to quantify the effect. One more councilor employed by the public sector increases spending by about 1%. The effect comes largely through the largest party and is specific to the employment sector of the municipal employee. The results are consistent with public employees having an information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to influence policy.

OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftAmerican Political Science Review
Volym112
Utgåva1
Sidor (från-till)68-81
Antal sidor14
ISSN0003-0554
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 09.08.2017
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

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  • 511 Nationalekonomi

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