R&D and subsidy policy with imperfect project classification

Thomas Gehrig, Rune Stenbacka*

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

1 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

We characterize optimal subsidies for firms facing limitations in their ability to correctly classify risky R&D projects. We demonstrate that the optimal subsidy is an increasing function of firms’ ability to reduce type-I errors in accepting projects with a success potential, and a decreasing function in their type-II error of adopting projects with no success potential. Moreover, the optimal subsidy is decreasing in the informational advantage regarding the assessment of project viability of private firms relative to the government.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Artikelnummer110966
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftEconomics Letters
Volym222
ISSN0165-1765
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 01.2023
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 511 Nationalekonomi

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