Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits

Ola Andersson, Håkan J. Holm, Jean Robert Tyran, Erik Wengström*

*Motsvarande författare för detta arbete

Forskningsoutput: TidskriftsbidragArtikelVetenskapligPeer review

3 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

Decision-makers often face incentives to increase risk-taking on behalf of others (e.g., they are offered bonus contracts and contracts based on relative performance). We conduct an experimental study of risk-taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample, and we find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that a lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but it is diminished by social concerns.

OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftScandinavian Journal of Economics
Sidor (från-till)1-27
ISSN0347-0520
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 18.03.2019
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

Nyckelord

  • 512 Företagsekonomi

Styrkeområden och områden med hög potential (AoS och AoHP)

  • AoS: Konkurrensanalys och servicestrategi - Kvantitativt konsumentbeteende och konkurrensekonomi

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