Sammanfattning
We study a duopoly model of history-based price competition with switching costs and demonstrate how strategic history-based pricing induces the owners of the firms to implement managerial short-termism by delegating the pricing decisions to managers with a discount factor lower than that of the owners. Managerial short-termism is a strategic device whereby owners can soften price competition at the stage when customer relationships are established. The degree of short short-termism is shown to depend on the market structure, the intensity of competition and the magnitude of switching costs.
Originalspråk | Engelska |
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Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskrift | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
Volym | 153 |
Nummer | September |
Sidor (från-till) | 200-222 |
Antal sidor | 23 |
ISSN | 0167-2681 |
DOI | |
Status | Publicerad - 04.08.2018 |
MoE-publikationstyp | A1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift |
Nyckelord
- 512 Företagsekonomi