Strategic short-termism: Implications for the management and acquisition of customer relationships

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We study a duopoly model of history-based price competition with switching costs and demonstrate how strategic history-based pricing induces the owners of the firms to implement managerial short-termism by delegating the pricing decisions to managers with a discount factor lower than that of the owners. Managerial short-termism is a strategic device whereby owners can soften price competition at the stage when customer relationships are established. The degree of short short-termism is shown to depend on the market structure, the intensity of competition and the magnitude of switching costs.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of economic behavior & organization
Volym153
UtgåvaSeptember
Sidor (från-till)200-222
Antal sidor23
ISSN0167-2681
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 04.08.2018
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

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