Strategic waiting in the IPO markets

Gonul Colak, Hikmet Günay

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25 Citeringar (Scopus)

Sammanfattning

The paper analyzes the strategic waiting tendencies of IPO firms. Our game theoretic model shows why some high-quality firms may strategically delay their initial public offering until a favorable signal about the economic conditions is generated by other issuing firms. Survival analysis suggests that IPOs in the highest quality decile have significantly higher median waiting days (since the start of a rising IPO cycle) than the IPOs in the lowest decile. During the early stages of an expanding IPO cycle the average firm quality is lower than in its later stages. We find supporting evidence also from the IPOs of future S&P 500 firms.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Referentgranskad vetenskaplig tidskriftJournal of Corporate Finance
Volym17
Utgåva3
Sidor (från-till)555-583
Antal sidor29
ISSN0929-1199
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 01.06.2011
MoE-publikationstypA1 Originalartikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift

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